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November 3, 1962

## MEMORANDUM:

MISSILES

We conclude that the work has been halted on the 6 MRBM sites and the 3 IRBM sites which have been identified and have been under observation since October 14th. These installations have been dismantled to a substantial degree and much of the equipment has been removed from the sites to unknown locations. We note the presence of a large amount of MRBM-related equipment at the port of Mariel with some indication that it is being loaded on the three ships there. We cannot exclude the possibility that the MRBM missiles and related equipment have been concealed. Nor can we exclude the possibility that there are other sites of both types which have not been discovered by our reconnaissance or related intelligence.

No IRBM missiles were observed prior to the commencement of dismantling and no evidence exists as to whether the IRBM missiles reached Cuba or were aboard ships that turned back.

Work on areas presumed to be nuclear warhead storage sites has apparently ceased and some precast concrete arches and supports presumably destined for these areas have been observed on the docks at Mariel.

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We do not know whether nuclear war heads are in Cuba - they may well be and this possibility should be considered in connection with the IL 28 and MIG aircraft question.

### IL 28 BOMBERS

Work on the IL 28s continues. At San Julian on October 15th we observed 21 unopened crates at this base. We have noted removal of IL 28 fuselages and components from crates and an increasing number of planes reaching operational status. As an example, on October 29th there were two aircraft assembled and four partially assembled. On November 2nd two aircraft were operational, five were being assembled and two additional fuselages had been removed from crates and were on the ramp. The San Julian base is surrounded by anti-aircraft artillery and our planes encountered ground fire from these batteries. Not all IL 28 crates observed on shipboard have been located in Cuba.

### SAM SITES

We believe the 24 surface to air missile sites are all operational and are controlled by an integrated island-wide highly sophisticated communication net which is Soviet controlled and operated. The SAM guidance radar, for example, is the very latest (C-band) type and hitherto has been noted only with Soviet units stationed in the USSR and East Germany.

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We have observed [REDACTED]

that the deployment of SAM sites was preceded by a long negotiation, a formal agreement, a period of training of the nationals involved and the supplying of relatively few Soviet operators and technicians to assist in the construction and initial operation of the defense system. The circumstances in Cuba were quite different. The equipment was shipped covertly and without prior notice, no training has been detected and thousands of Soviet technical personnel concurrently were sent into Cuba. From our knowledge of time required to train SAM site operators and from a study of the time involved in training U.S. military personnel in the proper handling of the NIKE missile systems, we conclude that at least a year and more probably 18 months of intensive training would be necessary for the Cubans to operate the SAM system now installed in Cuba.

#### USE OF CAVES

25X1 [REDACTED] reports available to us in recent days indicate the possibility of hiding MRBM and related equipment in the caves of Cuba. We have studied these caves. There are a very large number of them on the island, many of them big, and some are known to be used for the storage of military hardware and for accommodating military and security personnel. As an example, a VHF communication headquarters of the Cuban state security forces is located in a cave

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a short distance from Havana. The availability of these caves for clandestine use and the extreme difficulty of detecting such use together with  reports of the absence of heavy truck traffic on main highways, leads us to place some weight on the possibility of a deceptive operation on the part of the Soviets and the Cubans.

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NUMBER OF MISSILES LOCATED

We have seen only 33 missiles. We deduce, from an analysis of Soviet military structure and the shipping, the presence of 48 missiles in Cuba, and it is quite possible that there may be even more. We have announced publicly that we have seen about 30 missiles. The shipment of 30 crates will not convincingly prove that all missiles and their related equipment have been removed from Cuba. If missiles are held secretly, the danger will be very great for it is possible for the Soviets, should they so decide, to redeploy the MRBMs to alternate ~~pre-~~ *a few days* surveyed sites and be ready to launch some missiles within ~~2-3~~ *days*.

SUBMARINES

The USSR may have planned, and possibly still plans, to establish a submarine base in Cuba.

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CONCLUSION

~~All the above leads us to the conclusion~~ *We conclude* that the Soviets are not necessarily abandoning Cuba, but may continue to develop it as a piece of real estate important to the Soviet activities against the United States and Latin America.

We believe it is essential to have frequent complete aerial coverage of the island to determine missile site development, a system of ground inspection which might discover missiles in hiding or detect unusual movements over highways, and also a continuing method of inspecting further shipments to Cuba and verifying the outward movement of offensive weapons.